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Introduction
Valuation of enterprises has been a major stumblingblock  to privatization in transition
economies.  Although data about performance  of state-owned  enterprises under central planning is
plentiful, the value of that information is minimal in the context of a market economy, especially
where substantial progress has been made in price and trade liberalization.  Voucher privatization
schemes have emerged as a politically attractive alternative that overcome the valuation problem
through a decentralized system of bidding while generating an efficient allocation of shares through an
auction.  However, the functioning of these information markets and the process by which prices
emerge from these bidding rounds has not been analyzed.
TMe  Czech and Slovak Republics provide perhaps the best case for analyzing price
determination  under voucher privatization. In addition to being the first to attempt mass privatization,
the Czechs and Slovaks designed a scheme that was unique in its capacity to generate and use
information about market values. This paper focuses on how information was used to create a market
for enterprise shares; a  detailed description of the scheme is available elsewhere.'  The section that
follows provides a brief descr,ption of the way in which the voucher scheme in the Czech and Slovak
Republics addressed the information  problem associated  with valuation and compares that to other
mass privatization schemes in transition economies. Thereafter, econometric evidence on the
determinants of the equilibrium price level and dynamics for enterprise shares are presented.  The
final section draws some lessons about the design of the scheme and the role of information in
creating a market value for enterprise shares.
1/  Shafik,  N. (1993), -Making  a Market:  Mass Privatization  in the Czech  and Slovak  Republics,' Policy
Research Working Paper number 1231,  The World  Bank.-2  -
Alternative Approaches
There is not a great deal of theoretical literature that can guide the analysis of schemes
such as mass privatization.  Conventional  auction theory, while somewhat relevant, is based on
situations where the demand curve, often for a homogeneous  product, is unknown and the auctioneer
is concerned with revealing the demand curve to maximize revenue.  The focus of much of the
literature has been on the trade-offs associated with open versus sealed bid procedures, uniform
versus discriminatory price rules, sequential versus simultaneous auctions, and the risk of collusive
behavior under different schemes. 2 In a very interesting  study of the determinants of privatization
prices for enterprises auctioned  by the Mexican Government, Lopez-de-Silanes  analyzes the impact of
company performance and industry parameters, the auction process, and the prior restructuring
actions taken  by the state on net governrment revenues from privatization.3 He finds that  higher slaes
prices tend to be associated with the speed  of the process,  labor shedding,  firing of the  chief executive
officer of the enterprise  and  deinvestment,  while negative premiums  result from large  obligations  to
the labor force and minority control packages.  Prior restructuring by the government, debt
absorption, new investment  or performance improvement  programs have no beneficial impact on
ultimate government revenues from privatization auctions. In the case of mass privatization considered
here, the nature of the auction is rather special. The aggregate demand (coupons) and supply (shares)
2/  For surveys of this literature, see 3.L. Guasch and T. Glaessner (1993), 'Using Auctions to Allocate
and Price Long-Term Credit," The World Bank Research Observer volume 8, number 2, July.  R.
Fedman  and R. Mehra (1993), 'Auctions: Theory and Possible Applications to Economies in
Transition," IMF Working paper 93/12, February.  Feinstein, J. and M. Block (1985), 'Asymmetric
Information and Collusive Behavior in Auction Markets.'  American Economic Review. volume 75,
June.  R. Hansen (1985), 'Empirical Testing of Auction Theory."  Amerizan Economic Review.
volume 75, May.  E. Maskin and J.  Riley (1985), "Auction Theory with Private Values," Ainerican
Economic Review, volume 75, May.
3/  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Florencio (1994), "Determinants  of Privatization Prices,  rmimeograph,  Harvard
University, Cambridge, MA, January.-3  -
to be auctioned is fixed, but the true relative values of the non-uniform products to be auctioned is
unknown to both the auctioneer and to most bidders.
The vast literature on stock price determination in advanced market economies is also
relevant, but much of it has focused on tests of the efficient market hypothesis in an effort to evaluate
whether financial markets rationally value assets and prevent the generation of excess profits.'  The
two most widely used theories - the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Arbitrage Pricing
Theory (APT) focus on the importance  of systematic, non-diversifiable  factors for explaining changes
in asset prices.  This literature focuses on incremental  movements from one equilibrium for asset
prices to another and assumes vast amounts of past information, well functioning markets, and a
reasonably stable external environment  enabling forward-looking  behavior.  While this work is
particularly relevant for analysis of secondary market behavior, it does not provide much guidance for
the initial valuation of enterprise shares in a transition economy with limited markets and experiencing
a fundamental change in economy-wide  prices.
More recently, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) have considered the issue of
auction design in the context of mass privatization. 5 They argue that the most obvious auction design
would require each bidder to submit the number of shares desired and the maximum price s/he is
willing to pay.  However, such an auction would be overly complex and inaccessible  to small
investors.  An alternative is to allow each investor to bid all their vouchers for one enterprise,
4/  For examples,  see Fama, E. and K. French (1992), 'Me Cross-Section  of Expected  Stock  Retuns',
Journal  of Finance.  volume  48, number  2; Fama, E. (1991), 'Efficient  Makets:  I1' Journal  of
Finance  volume  46; Fams, E. and K. French (1988),  Dividend Yields and Expected Stock Retuns'
Journal of Financial Economics  volume 22, number 1; Poterba, L. and L  Summes  (1988), 'Meaz
Reversion in Stock Prices:  Evidence and Implications," Joumal of Financial Economics volume 22,
number 1; Poterba, J. and L  Summers (1986), 'The Persistence of Volaility and Stock Market
Returns.'  American Economic Review  volume 76.
5/  M. Boycko, A. Shleifer, R. Vishny (1993). 'Voucher Privatization,'  mimeograph, September.  For an
inteesting  analysis of the factors influencing the design of the Russian privatization progam,  see M.
Boycko, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1993). 'Privatizing Russia," mimeograph. August.- 4 -
effectively assuming that the demand curve for shares is unit elastic such that investors want to spend
a fixed amnount  on a chosen stock.  While such an auction design achieves simplicity and equity
objectives, superior information of some market participants cannot substantially influence final
prices.  Thus they recommend a combined scheme whereby uninformed investors make simple bids of
all their vouchers for one company while more sophisticated  investors are permitted to specify the
quantity and the maximum price for shares.  Although this auction design was used in Russia, less
than 27%  of the bidders chose to submit the more complicated  bids, possibly reflecting the paucity of
information about enterprise values.
Mass privatization  schemes have become very widespread in formerly centrally
planned economies, with examples in Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia. Mongolia, Poland
and the Czech and Slovak Republics. The Czech and Slovak scheme was the first such scheme and
only Russia and Lithuania have also advanced in implementing  mass privatization.  Since descriptions
of the different approaches are available elsewhere,' the focus here will be on the role of information
under different schemes to highlight the differences with the Czech and Slovak approach.
The role of information under other mass privatization schemes depends very much on
the design of the programs, which are largely the outcome of the political process.  In more
decentralized approaches, like that taken in the Czech and Slovak Republics described below, public
information and market forces play a cruc.al role in the valuation and allocation of shares.  In more
centralized approaches, such as in Poland, public information  is less important since the design of the
program is intended to reduce the need for active public involvement by relying on investment funds
to be informed, to be diversified to protect to citizens who own shares in the funds, and to exercise
61  For descriptions of the differences among these schemes, see I. Lieberman, M. Mejstik, J.  Burger, and
S. Rahuja (1994), 'Mass Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: A
Comparative Analysis," mimeograph, Washington. D.C.: The World Bank.- 5 -
governance.'  Where insiders (workers and managers) are major players in mass schemes (such as in
Russia and, to a lesser extent, in Lithuania), usually because of the political constraints to
implementing  privatization, the information  problem may be smaller, although the efficiency gains for
share markets that result from the public good character of information  are not realized'.
Information and Mass Privatization in the Czech and Slovak Republics
The mass privatization  scheme was based on the principle that citizens should receive
equal claims on enterprise shares to be privatized.  Each citizen was given 1000 points for bidding
purposes for a nominal fee of Kcs. 1000 (equivalent  to $35 or one week of the average wage).  The
assets to which these claims would be attached would be determined through a simuitaneous bidding
process.  The size of the transfer to citizens was purely a function of the number of people who chose
to participate in the scheme.  With 8.5 million participants, each Czech and Slovak citizen was
transferred claims on the equivalent of Kcs. 35,300 in book value terms on average (equivalent to
about $1250, or about one-half of annual per capita income).
71  The  Polish  program,  which  remains to be implemented,  relies heavily  on large  investment  funds that
hold  strategic  allocations  of shares  (33%) in enterprises.  Citizens  get shares  in funds.  wbo  then select
the enterprises  that will be  in their portfolio  based on a  'football  pool.'  Individuals  are  assigned  funds
in which  they will  place their  vouchers,  but individuals  are not given  the opportunity  to hold shares
directly  in enterprises.  Thus  the Polish approach  is more centralized  and protects  citizens  from
potential  initial  losses  likely in certain  enterprises  by forcing  diversification  on funds.
8/  The  Russian and  Lithuanian  schemes  are based on decentralized  bidding  whereby  enterprises  are
auctioned  sequentially,  not simultaneously.  In Lithuania.  vouchers  had  face values based  on citizen's
ages  and were  not  initially tradable.  Bidders could  use a combination  of vouchers  and/or  cash to bid
for shares  in either  small or  large  enterprises  or to pay  housing  loans.  While  information  about
enterprises  was published,  there was substantial  insider  knowledge,  especially  since  Lithuania  is a fairly
small  country.  In Russia,  bidders  specify  the number of vouchers  they want  to invest  in an  enterprise.
This  can either  be an  open bid whereby  the number of  shares they  receive  depends  on the number  of
competing  vouchers  submitted,  or  the bid  can be limnited  by either  a maximum  price  or  a minimum
number  of  shares  that are  acceptable  per voucher  bid.  The privatization  agency  establishes  a  floor
price,  below  which  bids are discarded.  The  final share  price is calculated  by taking  a weighted  average
of the  number  of bids at  the floor price  and  those specified  bids that fell above  the  floor  price.-6  -
'Equilibrium'  prices would emerge as a result of sequential bidding rounds after
which prices would be adjusted to reconcile supply and demand.  The equilibrium did not represent a
global equilibrium because foreigners were not permitted to obtain vouchers directly, nor were
vouchers tradable (unlike in Russia) prior to completion  of the rounds and formal issuance of shares
to participants.  In effect, the government created an artificial primary market where participation was
restricted to nationals who were given purchasing  power by the state in the form of vouchers.  This is
why the price level that emerged from the bidding process, defined in money term or in points per
share, was completely irrelevant because the scheme was intended to be a pure transfer of assets and
the Kcs 1000 fee was intended to cover only the administrative  costs of running the scheme.  What
was relevant were the relative prices that the bidding process generated for shares in different
enterprises and the price level that emerges in the secondary market for shares in which there is full
tradability.
Prior to initiation of the bidding rounds, there was a 'zero round'  in which citizens
had the opportunity to hand over their vouchers (or some portion thereof) for management by any one
of the 429 investment  funds (which functioned like mutual funds) that had emerged to participate in
the voucher scheme.  In effect, the zero round gave bidders a chance to self-select into groups of
inforned and uninformed buyers.  Because  uninformed buyers were more likely to give their points
to an investment fund, the zero round increased  the proportion of information relative to "noise" that
would emerge from the market.
At the start of the bidding process there were two types of information available to
bidders: (1) public information  on enterprise characteristics  that were published in the newspaper, and
(2) private information that individuals and funds had about enterprise prospects.  This private
information had the greatest value in the first bidding round when all enterprise shares were offered
for the same price.  Thereafter, bidders revealed their private information through their bids, whichwas reflected in the prices that emerged after each round.  This third type of infbrmatiora  on relative
prices for enterprise shares was revealed over time in the course of the bidding rounds.
Although the government issued warnings about the quality and relevance of data on
enterprises' past performance, a considerable quantity of data was provided to the public prior to
privatization. The Center for Coupon Privatization published a list of 1491 companies with a book
value of Kes. 300 billion (about $10.6 billion) on May 13, 1992 which would be included in the
coupon scheme.  This publication, which was widely available at newsstands  and post offices around
the country, included the following information for each enterprise: name, address. business activity,
identification number, shares offered, book value, value of other enterprise assets, debts, output in
1989-91, book profit in 1989-91, number of employees in 1989-91, allocation of non-coupon shares
(prior commitments of shares to foreign investors, domestic investors, restitution claims, the state or
the National Property Fund, or sale of shares through some third party such as a bank).  Since price
and trade liberalization had started in the summer of 1990 and the trading arrangements  under the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance collapsed in January 1990, the data on enterprise
performance in 1990  and 1991 did have some relevance  for future prospects.
In addition to this initial information, citizens were also provided with information
after completion of each bidding round.  Prices for shares (defined as number of shares per
investment  points) were posted for each enterprise.  The prices were based on a pricing formula
established by a committee in the Federal Ministry of Finance which sought to clear the market for
shares as soon as possible using a discriminatory price rule.'  In addition, data was provided on
2/  The pricing policy was based on the following  guidelines: (1) where demand for shares exactly equaled
supply, ill enterprise shares would be sold in that round; (2) where a firm's shares were
undersubscribed, those that bid received shares at that price and the remaining shares were offered in
the next bidding round at a lower price; (3) where there is excess demand for shares that is less than
25% of the shares on offer, individual citizens' demand was given priority over the investment funds;
(4) where the excess demand exceeds 25%, all shares are offered again in the next bidding round at a
higher price with the magnitude of the adjustment as a function of relative demand.- 8 -
demand and supply of shares after each bidding round, the price in the previous round, the proportion
of shares purchased by individual citizens versus investment  funds, and the number of shares
remaining for bids in the subsequent round.  Participants could of course use this intermediate
information to alter their bids in response to new information.
The design of the scheme, based on open, sequential  bidding rounds that were
conducted simultaneously  across the country, served to generate information  and create externalities
for uninformed bidders.  The bidding rounds themselves served to put information about enterprise
values into the public domain by allowing increasingly informed bidders to interact.  This is in
contrast to other types of auction markets. For example, a single simultaneous bidding round that
allows agents to make multiple bids (thereby revealing their demand curve) could have been used, but
would have favored those who had access to privileged information and generated no intermediary
information  for other bidders.  Similarly, an auction that was not simultaneous, but was conducted
individually  for each enterprise (similar to that in Russia or in Lithuania)  would not have generated
the relative price information that facilitated the emergence of a market equilibrium.
Converizing  to Equilibrium Prices
All shares were priced at 3 shares per 100 voucher points at the start of the first
bidding round.  The theoretical market clearing price, which would equilibrate the supply of shares
with the demand in total points, was 3.5 shares for 100 points at the start of the first round.  Of
course the starting price was fairly arbitrary, and the objective of the bidding rounds was to define
relative prices for all enterprises from this arbitrary base.
In order to assess how agents used the market information  provided to them to
determine relative prices of enterprises' shares, a series of cross-section  regressions using ordinary
least squares has been run for each bidding round with the change in share prices on the left hand side-9  -
in each round and enterprise characteristics in 1991  on the right hand side for 1490 enterprises in the
voucher scheme:'
Pi, - Pi,,  =  aO  +  Ea,*..(characteristics), +  a..,Devk,
where "P" is the price of enterprise Yi"  at time 't'.  The 'n"  enterprise characteristics (which are
listed in table 1) include: book value, employment, equity/labor, equity/output, profit/output,
profit/equity, employment/output,  liabilities (mainly debt)/equity, share of equity bought by a foreign
investor, share of equity bought by a domestic investor, labor force, region, and dummies for whether
the enterprise is based in the Czech or Slovak Republic.  After the initial bidding round, the deviation
of an enterprise's share price from the average was also included and defined as:
Devi,  =  Average Price,., - P.,
or the average price in round t-l minus enterprise i's price in the previous round.  This price
deviation variable could be considered a proxy for the relative market return associated with an asset
in a CAPM framework.  The percentage of shares sold in the previous round out of the total offered
in that round was also included as an explanatory  variable.  Because the left hand side variable is
defined as shares per points, implying that cheaper shares have higher values (a bidder would get a
larger number of shares per points bid), the signs of the right hand side should be interpreted as
follows - a positive sign indicates that the variable has a negative effect on the share price while a
negative sign indicates a positive effect on share prices.  Although there were five sets of prices
posted for shares, there were actually four rounds of bidding since the prices in the first round were
arbitrarily set.
10/  One enyterprise was dropped from the sample because of insufficient data.- 10  -
Table 1:  Price Determnination  in Bidding Rounds.
CHANGE IN PRICE
ENTERPRISE  CHARACTERISTICS 11  ROUND I  ROUND 2  ROUND 3  ROUND  4
Ecuation  1.1.  1.3.  1.3.  1.4.
Constant  0.02  0.05  -0.04  -0.03
(17.06).*  (6  180)*  (-17.6)--  (-18.35)-
Book value  -0.00  -0.00  0.00  -0.00
(-1.33)  (-3.05)"  (2.56)'  (-0.14)
Employment  In 191  0.00  0.00  -0.00  0.00
(4.20)-  (11971-  (-8.50).  MMI
EquitlyEnm)2oymant  0.00  0.00  -0.00  -0.00
(1.58)-  (3.46)  (-4.49)}  (-0.60
Equity/Output  -0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
(-0.37)  (0.27)  M1GM  11.78)-
ProfhUOutput  -0.01  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00
(-4.87)"  (-0.34)  (-0.73)  (-0.32)
Profit/Equity  -0.01  0.00  -0.00  0.00
(-8.46)..  (0.40)  (-0.61)  (0.07)
Employment/Output  0.15  -0.53  -026  0.04
________  ________  ________  __  _  (1.18)  (-0.87)  (-1.31)  (0.30)
UabilitylEquity  0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00
_________________________________  (1.85)'  (-2.46)  (0.76)  (1.74)-
Share  of equity for  -0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00
loreign owner  (-7.67)"  (0.96)  (0.70)  (-0.43)
Share  of equity for  -0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00
domestic owner  (-7907)  (0.85)  (0.17)  (-0.76)
Republic 21  0.01  0.03  0.00  0.00
(4.20)"  (3.60)*  (1.41)  (1.08)
Price deviation Irom average  -2.71  0.32  0.43
prices In the previous round  (-20.30)'  (42.37).  (55.04)"
Percentage  of dwres  old in  0.00  0.01  0.03  -0.00
previous round (out of total  (1.07)  (0.81)  (p.75)"  (-0.64)
shareo  offered in that round)
R-squared  0.17  0.30  0.70  0.74
Adjusted R-equared  0.16  0.35  0.09  0.73
S.E. of regression  0.03  0.13  0.04  0.03
Log likelihood  3066.97  835.35  2221.55  2465.53
Durbin-Watson stat  1.87  1.91  1.83  LOs
F-statistic  23.97  57.50  224.50  256.09
Numberolobservations  1421  1348  1295  1214
Note:
11  The lelt hand  ide variable  is  defined as shares per points implying that cheaper shares have higher valuesa  podve  osign  on a right hand sde  variable
should be interpreted as a negative effect on the share price while a negative sign indicates a posiUve  effect on dsare price while a negative sign indicate
a positive elect on share price.
2J  The Republic dummy used was 0. 1. for Czech Rep  and Slovak Rep for all the rounds.
Indicates significant at 5% level of significance.
Indicates signifcant  at 1% level of significance.  The I  statistcs are in parenthesis.- lt  -
First Bidding  Round: Revealing  Initial  Information.  The spread in prices after the
first round  of bidding  ranged  from a minimum  price of 10 shares  for 100  points and a maximum
price of 400 points  for 1 share  - equivalent  to a forty-fold  spread  from  the lowest  to the highest  price
shares. The first equation  in table 1 indicates  clearly  that  profitability,  the size of the enterprise's
labor  force, the presence  of a major  domestic  or foreign  strategic  investor,  and the Republic  in which
the enterprise  is located  (with  a negative  premium  on Slovak  firms)" are the major determinants  of
the differentiation  in prices  between  rounds  one and two.  Large  labor  forces were a negative  factor,
although  not book  value,  implying  that it is not size per se, but large workforces  that tended  to be
associated  with negative  price adjustments.  In contrast,  high profitability  (relative  to output or to
equity)  had positive  effects  on prices  as did the presence  of strategic  investors  likely to play an active
role in governance.' 2 High capital/labor  and debt/equity  ratios also have  significant  negative  effects
on price adjustment,  albeit  at the 5% level.
However,  tfiese  right  hand side variables,  which  reflect  the "fundamentals"  of
enterprises'  past performance,  explain  only about 16%  of the variation  in prices after the first bidding
round,  implying  that private  information  (such as reputation  or insider  information)  played  an
11/  The  importance  of the Republic  dummy  is consistent  with the observed  behavior  of both investment
funds  and individuals  after the first round of bidding.  Ninety-nine  percent  of Czech individuals  bid for
Czech  firms and 95% of Czech-based  IPFs bid for Czech  firms. In Slovalia, 815%  of individual
investors  also  concetrated on firms  in their own  Republic,  but only 53  % of the points of Slovak  IPFs
were  allocated  to Slovak  firms.  Thus aU individual  investors  tended  to focus  on enterplses  in their
own  Republics,  possibly  because  of familiarity  with certain  enterprises  and owing  to fears about  legal
complications  associated  with the impending  break-up  of the Federation. In the case of the IPFs, there
was  a divergenc with Czech  IPFs concentrting  an  Czech  enterpnses  whereas Slovak  IPFs spread  their
bids  almost  evenly  across  the two  Republics.
1jI  Foreign  investors  in the Czec  Republic  concentrated  on 41 enterpriss in which the foreign  investors
share  averaged  39%. In Slovakia,  foreign  investors  bought  half as many  sham,  which were even
more  concentrated  in 10 enterprises  and also avaged  39% of the shares  in these firms. Domestic
direct  investment  was actually  more important  for enterprises  m the coupon  scheme  than foreign
investment.  In the Czech  Republic,  domestic  investors  bought  holdings  that averge 41% of shares
concentrated  in 90 enterprises. In Slovaia,  domestic  investors  concentrated  on 31 enterprises  with
holdings  averaging  36%.- 12 -
important  role.  Although  the published  information  on enterprise  characteristics  could not explain  all
of the movement  in prices after  the first round of bidding,  there is interesting  anecdotal  evidence
about  the degree  to which  bidders  did use the information  provided  by the government  about
enterprise  performance.  In one fanous case, a typographical  error resulted  in an extra zero  being
added  to the profits of a hotel being  offered  for privatization.  At the end of the first round of
bidding,  demand  for shares  of the hotel  were about  400 times  the supply  of shares  - implying  that
bidders  did rely on published  data in addition  to 'insider" information.  This hotel became  the
maximum  price enterprise  entering  the second  bidding  round.
Second  Bidding  Round: Investment  Pause  and Quality  Focus. The results of the
second  bidding  round reflected  in equation  1.2 indicate  that while  some  enterprise  characteristics
continued  to play a significant  role in explaining  price changes  (such as size, capital  intensity  and
location),  others  ceased  to be significant. In particular,  profitability  and the presence  of a strategic
investor  were no longer important  for price changes,  since  this information  had already  been
incorporated  into the price levels  that emerged  after the first bidding  round. The coefficient  on the
price deviation  variable,  which  captures  the extent  to which  an enterprise's  price was an woutlier,w
emerged  as far more significant  than any other explanatory  variable,  implying  that such dynamic
relative  price information  became  more important  for price changes  than  the static  information  on
enterprise  characteristics.  The negative  sign  of the price deviation  variable  indicates  that there was a
tendency  for price divergence  during  the second  bidding  round  as enterprises  with  differing  prospects
became  differentiated  after information  had been  revealed  after  the first round. The inclusion  of this
price deviation  variable  also served  to more  than double  the overall  explanatory  power  of the
regression.
Ultimately,  the average  price of shares  sold was  2.28 per 100  points, implying  that it
was the more expensive  shares  that tended  to sell as bidders  tried to secure  shares  in very desirable- 13  -
enterprises  for relatively  low prices in the early stage  of price differentiation.  Because  equilibrium
prices were emerging  only for high priced  shares,  there were a large number  of enterprises  in which
there was little interest  after the first two  bidding  rounds,  especially  large companies  in heavy
industries. There is some  evidence  that the government's  price committee  adjusted  share  prices
excessively  downward  for enterprises  in which  there was little market  demand  after the first two
rounds. Therefore,  the price divergence  that emerged  at the start of the third round was the greatest,
with the minimum  share  price at 97 shares  for 100  points  and the maximum  of 1 share  for 800 points
- equivalent  to a 776-fold  spread  between  the highest  and  lowest price firms.
Th1ird  Bidding  Round:  Market  Divergence  and Bargain  Hunting. There was a surge
of demand  in the third round, especially  by individuals  who  had restrained  from bidding  in previous
rounds  to see what information  would  be revealed  about  possible  equilibrium  values  for shares.'
There was substantial  "bargain-hunting"  in the third round as bidders focused  on low priced  shares.
The average  price of shares  for which  there were bids  fell dramatically  from 3.04 per 100  points in
the second  round to 13.76  per 100  points in the third round. The differences  in bidding  behavior
across  republics  persisted  and was increasingly  reflected  in price divergence  as the average  price of
shares  bought  in the Czech  Republic  was 2.55 per 100  points  while it was 5.59 per 100  points  in the
Slovak  Republic.
The results  for the third round reported  in equation 1.3 of table 1 are similar  to the
previous  rounds  because  of the importance  of the price deviation  in improving  the overall explanatory
power  of the regression. However,  after  the third round  of bidding,  the sign of the price deviation
variable  is positive  - implying  a tendency  for converging  behavior  as the prices  of outlying  firms
fI/  Participation  rates  between  individuals  and funds  differed  considerably  in the early  rounds. For
exmple, the fiuds bid 92% of their points  in the second  round  whereas  individuals  bid only 78% of
their  available  points. The  investment  funds  bid aggressively  throughout  the process  for fear of baving
worhess  points  remaining  after the final  round. However,  individuals  could  also afford to wait
because  the pnce clearing  mechanism  favored  individual  bidders  by reducing  the allocation of shares
for the investment  fimds  when  excess  demand  for shares  was less than 25%.- 14 -
tended  to return  to the average. In addition,  the lagged  price is significant  for the first time and the
positive  sign is consistent  with the evidence  of converging  behavior. Because  of these signs  of market
convergence,  the minimum  share  price was actually  raised  going  into the fourth  round - from 97
shares  for 100  points  to 60 shares  per 100  points  - and the maximum  price was only increased  by
25% - from 1 share  for 800 points  to 1 share  for 1000  points. Tlis reduced  the spread  between  the
highest  and lowest  price firms  to 600-fold,  from the high of 776-fold  at the start of the third bidding
round.
Fourth  Bidding  Round: An Emerging  Equilibrium. The government  announced  that
the prices  that emerged  after the fourth  round of bidding  (i.e. the prices posted  in round 5) would  be
the final  ones because  there were a number  of signs  that the market  had cleared. Thirty-six  funds  had
exhausted  all of their points and 22 funds  had less  than 100  points  remaining. By the final round  of
bidding,  the informational  content  of the information  on enterprise  characteristics  had been completely
absorbed  into the price level. Thus  these variables  are almost  all insignificant  in explaining  the
change  in prices during  the final  bidding  round in equation  1.4. The significance  and sign of the
price deviation  variable  again indicates  the importance  of relative  price information  in the
convergence  toward equilibrium  prices. The relative  price information  also plays  a crucial  role in the
significant  improvement  in the explanatory  power  of the regression,  with an adjusted  R 2 of 0.73.  The
average  selling  price in the fourth  round was 10.68  shares  per 100  points, implying  that the
equilibrium  in lower  priced  shares  had finally emerged  after  the overshooting  that had occurred  in the
previous  round. By the fifth round,  92.8% of all shares  had been sold and 98.8% of all points  had
been  used. The majority  of shares  in the 1491  enterprises  included  in the scheme  were sold, with  the
exception  of 117  enterprises  which  were characterized  by excess  demand  and would  be privatized  by
other  means.- 15 -
The Importance of Revealed Market Information
Because information revealed in each round is embodied in the price that emerges
from the bidding in that round, lagged prices should be an indicator of revealed market information.
Table 2 provides estimates of the importance of lagged prices for price determination in various
rounds using an AR (1) specification:
Pi, =  fRk.l).
There was no informational content in the arbitrary prices set in the first round, so nothing is reported
for the second round.  In the third round, the autoregressive component of prices was 34%, although
the extremely low R 2 is an indicator that prices were still far from equilibrium levels.  By the fourth
round, the autoregressive component of prices had reached 65% and the extremely high R 2 is
consistent with other indicators of market convergence in that round.  By the fifth round, the
coefficient on the autoregressive variable falls slightly to 58% but the R 2 remains high at 84%.  By
the final rounds, prices were behaving like a 'random walk," which is consistent with expectations
about how an efficient asset market would function.' 4
Table 2 also provides results for changes in prices:" 5
a  pit  =  f(  a  PA,,).
which capture the oscillating equilibrium that emerged from the bidding rounds.  The significance of
lagged price changes indicates that there was some delay in processing information, consistent with a
partial adjustment model of price formation.
14/  For survey  of the literature  examining  individual  autocorrelation  as a test of the efficient  markets
hypothesis,  see Fama, E. (1970),  'Efficient Capital  Markets: A Review  of Theory  and Empirical
Work," Joumal  of Finance.  25, pp. 383417.
151  Again,  because  there  was no informational  content  in the arbitrary  prices  set in the first round, the
change  in prices  between  rounds  1 and 2 carries  no market  information  and is not included  bere.- 16 -
Table 2:  Role of Lagged Price in Determining Price Levels
and Changes in Bidding Rounds
LAGGED  PRICE  LEVEL  IN  ROUNDS  PRICE  DIFFERENCE  IN  ROUNDS
PRICE/DIFFERENCE
3  4  5  4 
EQUATION  2.1.  2.2.  2.3.  2.4.  2.5.
P2-  0.34
____  ____  ___  ____  ____  ___  (2 . 10 )  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
P3  0.65  -0.04
__  (_(90.8  4)  _  (-3  .05)**
______________________  0.00_______  _________  _  0(79.83)6  0  . (17.53)0*
R-squared  0.00  0.86  0.84  0.01  0.20
Adjusteod  R-squared  0.00  0.86  0.04  0.01  0.20
S.E.  of  regssion  0.18  0.04  0.03  0.08  0.13
Log likelihood  380.59  2141.01  2456.88  1457.36  727.46
Durbin-Watson  1.84  1.75  1.97  1.93  1.74
F-statistic  4.42  8251.92  6373.96  9.32  307.57
Number  of Observations  1296  1295  1214  1295  1214
Notes:
The  't'  statistics are in parcnthesis.
Indicates signiricant at  5% lcvel of  significance.
*  Indicates  significant at  1% Icvcl of significancc.
The negative  sign of the lagged price change for round four confirms the reversal after the
overshooting of prices in round three - a large positive change in prices in round three was followed
by a negative adjustment in round four, and vice versa.  In contrast, the positive sign for the change
in prices in round 5 indicates convergence  toward equilibrium as prices adjusted in the same direction
after round 4.
The importance of lagged prices is capturing both a market phenomenon and the
market's rules.  The increasing coefficient  size and explanatory  power of lagged prices over time
indicates  that such revealed price information, rather than enterprise characteristics, mattered more for- 17 -
the emergence  of the equilibrium, particularly in later rounds.  In addition, the pricing rule used to
post new prices at the start of each bidding round relied on past prices, and relative supply and
demand for shares to set prices in subsequent rounds.
There is also evidence  that individual  citizens relied on information revealed by the
investment funds to guide their bidding.  The superior information about enterprise prospects gathered
by the funds could be used most effectively in the first bidding round when it was still private
information.  By the second bidding round, there is a clear correlation between citizens' demand for
shares in a particular enterprise (i) in round two (DEMCIT,.) with investment funds demand in round
1 (DEMIPF*l)
DEMCIT;  =  18902.9 + 0.19  DEMIPF;,  - 0.07 DEMCITi,
(8.12)  (23.83)  (3.39)
R2(adj) = 0.37
DW =  1.96
F statistic = 432.07
where the 't"  statistics are reported in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates.  Interestingly,
citizens' own bids were negatively correlated with each other, implying that they trusted the judgment
of the funds more than that of other citizens. In contrast, investment fund bids were highly correlated
with each other, but not with bids by citizens:
DEMIPFj  =  6198.53 + 0.59 DEMIPFi, - 0.33 DEMCIT 1,
(2.07)  (57.65)  (12.32)
R2(adj.) =  0.76
DW  =  1.98
F statistic =  2312.98
Thus the market appears to have recognized  the superior information that the investment  funds
possessed and uninformed bidders used this information, which was revealed after the first round, to- 18  -
generate a more informed equilibrium. There was also an inherent bias in favor of citizens realizing
their bids as a result of the pricing rules.  Where there was excess demand for an enterprise's shares
that was less than 25% of the shares on offer, individual  citizens' bids were given priority over
investment funds.
Determination of Equilibrium Price Levels
The determinants of equilibrium price levels are analyzed in table 3 with all right
hand side variables included as levels and as logs.  The left hand side variable is the price in the fifth
bidding round (defined as shares per number of points bid) or the final price at which all shares were
sold in a previous bidding round.  Observations were excluded for twenty-two enterprises where more
than 50% of their shares remained unsold after the fifth bidding round on the assumption  that this
final price could not be considered an equilibrium price.
The results in the levels (equation 3.1) are broadly consistent with the determinants of price
adjustment in each round described previously. Positive effects on prices result from high rates of
profitability and the presence of strategic investors.  Since domestic and foreign strategic investors
tended to take sizable stakes (averaging  40% of an enterprises' shares), their participation increased
the likelihood of effective governance in the form of a majority shareholder.  The Republic in which
an enterprise was located had a negative effect on price - consistent with the 40% discount at which
Slovak enterprises sold.
Large size (as measured by labor force size) has a significantly negative effect on the
price of shares.  This would seemn  to imply that the number of employees was a better indicator of
size (especially given socialist accounting  practices whose low rates of depreciation tended to
overstate the value of capital assets). The size of the labor force was probably a good indicator of
political importance, possible union activity and likely future state intervention in an enterprise, all- 19-
factors which appear to have had a negative effect on price.  In those enterprises where size
negatively affects share prices, it is overmanning, that has adverse effects, while highly productive
workers are an asset.  Large labor forces and very capital-intensive  production (as measured by the
capitalloutput ratio) are associated with low share prices.
However, it is interesting to note that when employment is included as a squared
terms, it is also significant. This implies that the effect of size on price is a "U-shaped' quadratic -
that large size has a negative effect up to a point (which is defined as  more than 22,000 workers),
after which it has a favorable effect on price.  This level of employment is unusual - with the
average labor force in the sample of 850, with a minimum number of 6 workers and a maximum
number of 34,231.  Therefore large labor forces have consistently negative effects on share prices for
virtually all of the sample range, with only two enterprises observed to have a labor force in excess of
the turning point of 22,000 workers.
Equation 3.2 reports the results of a regression in logs. 1'  Perhaps the most striking
result is that the explanatory power increases alnost threefold.  In the levels regressions, the
characteristics  variables could explain about 10% of the variation in prices.  In logs, the adjusted R 2
increases  substantially, enabling the characteristics  to explain 29% of the variation in prices.  The
significance  of the variables also changes slightly,  with the size of the labor force, book value, the
capital intensity of the enterprise (measured by the capital/labor ratio) indebtedness, and the Republic
in which an enterprise is located  all associated with lower prices, while participation by domestic of
foreign direct investors is associated with higher prices.
The major difference in the log results is the diminishing  importance of profitability
and the significance of book value, instead of employment, as an indicator of size.  Not surprisingly,
161  Because  some observations  for profits and liabilities had negative values, a constant was added in order
to calcuat, a logarithmic  value.- 20 -
book value and employment are closely associated, with a correlation coefficient  of 0.61.  However,
it is interesting to note that the turning points for book value in equation 3.2 and for employment in
equation 3.1 occur at very different points in the sample range.  Given that the average book value in
the sample is about Kcs 380 million (about $11 million), the turning point of about Kcs 400,000
occurs at a fairly low book value, which is close to the sample mean, implying that the market v.ewed
small size as advantageous  only at very low levels of book value, after which size had favorable
effects on share prices.  Thus large, well known enterprises may sell for higher prices because of
reputation premiums or because they are 'too  big to fail'  and there are expectations  of a government
bail-out in the future if there are problems.  The popularity of commercial banks' shares, which sold
for very high prices despite widespread awareness of bad loan portfolios, would seem to reflect
expectat  ions that such important enterprises would not be allowed to go bankrupt.
Because the coefficient estimates in equation 3.2 can be interpreted as elasticities, the
relative importance of the explanatory variables can be assessed. Thus the most important factors for
price determination were size (with an elasticity greater than one), capital intensity and the Republic
of location.  This is consistent with the widespread  view that heavy industries (of which these were
relatively more in the Slovak Republic) had more adverse prospects.  Foreign investor participation
played a more important role than domestic investor participation, implying that bidders were willing
to pay a premium for foreign expertise.'?
It is interesting  to note that even in the best fitting regression in table 3, the
'inherent" characteristics of enterprises provided as official information could never explain more
than 29% of the variation in price levels across enterprises.  The remaining differences must be
attributed to unofficial sources of information about enterprises' performance obtained prior to the
bidding rounds or revealed in the process of bidding.
17/  This is consistent  with results  from  Mexico which indicate  !hat foreign  participation  tended  to increase
the price which  govermment  received  when  privatizing  state-owned  enterpises, see L6pezrde-Silanes
(1994),  'Determinants  of Privatization  Prices"  Mimeographic,  Harvard  University,  Cambridge,  MA,
January.- 21 -
Table 3: Determinants  of "Eauilibrium"  Price Level  in Final Round
ENTERPRISE  CHARACTERISTICS  11  LEVELS  LOGS
Equallon  31.  32.
Corstanl  t  0.06  -1-.07
(t4.75)  (10.32)
Book vaue  0.00  1.14
(0.62)  (3.41)
Employmdnt  In  1991  0.00  0.61
(5.38)  (225)
Equity/Empioymrn-  0oo  0.67
(1.48)  (4.15)  -
Equny/Oulput  0.00
(3.42)  *_
Prolit/Outputl  -102  -0.12
(3.10)  *  (1.39)
Profit/EquIty  .0.01  0.03
(3.52)  (0.30)
Employment/OutAput  035  0.46
(1.02)  (5.80)
LUabllity/Eqully  0.00  0.14
(0.14)  (5.78)
Share  d equity for selilng  O.W  -0.35
to foreign owner  (3.25)  (6.74)
Share  d equity  for seiling  0.00  .026
to domestic  owner  (3.03)  ;  (6.90  **
RepubUlc  2/  0.03  0.61
(6.45  *-  (7.17)  *
Book  vaue squared  0.00  4.05
(0.09)  (4.62)
Employment  squared  0.00  -0.01
_(.37)  *-  74)
R-quared  0.10  0.30
Adjusted fsquared  0.10  0.29
S.E.  of regssion  0.08  1.00
Log likelIhood  1542.89  -2083.33
Durbln-Waeson  stat  1.92  1.64
F-stalstiLc  13.05  50.85
Number  of obsernatlons  1468  1468
Note:
1/  The  let hand side  wadable  Is deflned  as shares  per pots  Implng  thal cheaper  shares  have highervalues.
a posulve  sign  en a right  hand side  vwable should be Intrpted  as  a ngalve  effect  n te  share
prce whNle  a negaIe  sign Indicates  a poslle  elect on share  pric.
2/  The Republc dummy used  was 0.1. for Slovk  Rep  and Czech  Rep  In levell  tems: while It was1.2.  for
Czech  Rep,  and Slovak Rep.  In log  tems.
Inkticates  signficarnt  at 5%  level  d  signIilcance.
xNdicates  slgntkcant  at 1%  leve of signMcance.  The r stass  we In parenesis.- 22 -
Concludine  Remarks
The central  ch.ilenge  of the transition  from central  planning  is how to create markets
where  none existed  previouslv. The Czech  and Slovak  Republics  had been  economies  in which  98%
of assets  where in state hands  and private  property  rights, much  less asset markets,  did not exist. The
mass  privatization  scheme  was designed  in a way that reflects  an appreciation  of what makes  markets
work  - a set of clear rules, that maximiz  the public  good character  of information,  and an
enforcement  mechanism  that is impersonal  and  fair.  This design  served  to improve  the relative  price
discovery  process  by overcoming  informational  asymmetries  among  market  participants.
The econometric  results  presented  here indicate  the way in which  this artificially
created  market  used information  to converge  to an equilibrium. Public  information  on enterprises'
past performance  clearly  mattered,  despite  the poor quality  of the data, especially  in the early rounds
when  private  infonnation  had not yet been  revealed. However,  public  information  about  past
performance  alone  could  never explain  more  than 29% of the variation  in the ultimate  equilibrium
prices. Attempts  to explain  stock  price changes  in the United  States  using data  on systematic
economic  influences,  the returns  on other  stocks  in the same  industry  and by public  firm-specific
news  events  obtain  other strikingly  similar  results."  In the Czech  and Slovak  Republics,  information
about  enterprise  prospects  revealed  through  the bidding  process  - through  lagged  prices or through
the deviation  of prices  from the averages  in each  round  - where  the key to the emergence  of
equilibrium  prices. This market  information  could  explain  about 85% of the variation  in prices  by the
final rounds. Of course  private  or  insider' information  about  enterprise  prospects  was important
throughout  the process,  but much  less  so over time as prices increasingly  behaved  like a random
18/  See Roil (1988)  who finds an adjusted  R 2 of only 0.35 with monthly  data  and  0.20 with daily data.
Roll, R. (1988), 'R2',  The  Joumal  of Finance volume  43. number  2.- 23 -
walk.  Bidders obviously learned quickly from each other, as evidenced by the correlation between
citizens' bids and investment funds' bids in the previous round as well as by the diminishing size of
the residual that could not be explained by lagged prices in the later bidding rounds.
Other approaches to mass privatization rely more heavily on the 'secondary market",
when shares will be traded on the stock exchange, to generate an appropriate assessment of asset
values.  The initial valuation that emerges from the 'primary market" may seem even less of an issue
in give-away schemes such as mass privatization when compared to conventional  stock flotations
where the initial valuation affects govermment  revenues.  But if improved inforinatitin is the first step
toward more efficient asset markets and corporate governance, then the participants in the Czech and
Slovak mass privatization scheme have a head start on other transition economies.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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